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Abstract. Axelrod (1992) highlighted the important role of cooperation in actors’ strategy 
and performance in the social interactions. This importance is confirmed by Thépot (1998). 
The understanding of individual propensity to cooperate is an important field to better know 
their strategies and the performance of the economic systems’ in which they evolve. In this 
sense, game theory indicates that individual’s propensity to cooperate depends on his 
anticipation of decision that will be made by other participants and his expected gain. The 
challenge of this assumption based on experimental study generated other motivations to 
individual decision. An individual can be motivated by altruism, reciprocity, inequity 
aversion, …these motivations, other than self-pecuniary interest, form the social 
preferences theory which opened the way to other reading of individual propensity to 
cooperate within organizations. A better understanding of the influence of these social 
preferences on the decisions to cooperate (or not) within organizations have motivated this 
research. It relies on data collected through an experimental study which allowed the 
identification of the motivations (altruism, desire of reciprocity, inequity aversion,…) 
which best characterize individual social preferences and to study its influence on the 
contributions made in public good game. It concludes that the presence of rational selfish 
persons only motivated by pecuniary gain is the cause of cooperation’s declining within 
organizations and that individuals motivated by an inequity aversion have some resilience 
when they experiment a lack of cooperation from other organizations members. It therefore 
establishes that an individual social preference influence his propensity to cooperate within 
organization. As well, in addition to other determinants found in the literature, the 
conclusions of this research underline the role of social preferences in the functioning and 
the dynamics of organizations.  
Keywords. Social preferences, Cooperation, Experimental study. 
JEL. C72, C81. 
 
1. Introduction 
he dominant paradigms in economic and management were based on the 
postulate of the homo-economicus, derivative from neoclassical theory that 
assume that individual decisions are dictated by a look for a self-pecuniary 
interest. In this framework, economic situations are the result of interactions 
between individuals whose decision are made to satisfy their own interests (Giraud, 
2000; Miller, 2003; Gibbons, 1992). 
The game theory served as a framework for the analysis of the interactions 
between participants. It allowed us to understand, among other things, the 
conditions that favor or not cooperation between economic agents. Let’s recalled 
that the dictionary Larousse define the cooperation as a method of action by which 
individuals or families with common interests constitute a business where each 
member’s rights are equal and where the profit is distributed only between the 
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partners in proportion of their participation in the activity [Retrieved from]. It is 
essential to organizations’ well-functioning. It is right that the conditions of its 
emergence and maintenance generate research in management. 
Indeed, economists and mathematicians have long been interested in the optimal 
decision that should be made by each participant in strategic interactions through 
the game theory. In this paradigm, an individual’s propensity to cooperate depends 
on its expected gain which is a function of his decision and those of other 
participants. 
The empirical validation of the foundations and conclusions of this theory by 
the Experimental Economics established that individual’s decisions could be 
motivated by altruism, desire of reciprocity, inequity aversion, or reciprocity, … 
these motivations, different from the strict self-interest search constitute the 
concept of social preferences. It is defined as the motivations that govern 
individual decision in social interactions. This paradigm opened the way for the 
development of other key reading of individual’s propensity to cooperate in 
organizations. 
Based on the development of the research on the field, we can note the need for 
the refinement of our understanding of the distribution of social preferences in a 
given population and their influence on the propensity to cooperate. The latter is 
defined as an individual’s inclination to focus in his decisions on options that are 
likely to make a gain for the whole community; even if it appears, at first intention, 
less beneficial for his self-well-being.  
It is to contribute to a better understanding of the influence of social preferences 
on cooperation within organizations that this empirical research has been 
conducted. It focuses on answering the following question: What is the influence of 
social preferences on the propensity to cooperate within organizations? The 
understanding of the influence of social preferences on the emergence of 
cooperation in organizations is crucial to enrich the understanding of preferred 
options in individual decision making and its influence on organizations dynamics. 
This research provides a better understanding of the influence of social preferences 
on the propensity to cooperate within organizations, based on an experimental 
study conducted in the African context.  
It makes a triple contribution: theoretical, managerial, and methodological. On 
the theoretical level, the questioning of the validity of individual decision making 
theories in social interactions should allowed the assessment of the completeness of 
available paradigms. It will therefore open the reflection on the construction of an 
unified and efficient framework to understand individual preferences in social 
interactions.  
On the managerial level, the identification of the link between social 
preferences and the propensity to cooperate opens the way for the identification of 
the actions that can be carried out to generate cooperation in organization. On the 
methodological level, the use of experimental study allows us to propose an 
approach for the identification of social preferences underlying individual 
preferences. In addition, the use of specific analysis tools should contribute to the 
establishment of a specific approach allowing an efficient framework to test the 
validity of the theories mobilized. 
To achieve this, we base the analysis on the data collected by Ouattara (2015) 
through an experimental study conducted during the months of February and 
March 2013. It involved a sample of 130 students of CESAG Business School’s 
master programs. We consider data on four (4) treatments composed of a dictator, 
an ultimatum, a trust and a public good game.  
It comes from the analysis that individual social preference influences the 
propensity to cooperate. Indeed, individuals characterized by different social 
preferences have different behaviors in public good game. The presence of selfish 
rational individuals is the cause of the cooperation’s decline within organizations 
and that inequity averse individuals are resilient to the lack of cooperation from 
other organizations members. 
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The following of the document is divided into three sections. It begins with a 
literature review on the foundations and tools for social preferences and the 
propensity to cooperate analysis. The methodology is presented in the second 
section. Followed by the presentation of the experimental study and the data 
mobilized in this research. The third section is devoted to the presentation of the 
results of the research. 
 
2. Social preferences and cooperation, foundations and 
analysis tools 
Right now, there are many researches on the propensity to cooperate and the 
motivations of decision-making mechanisms in social interactions. Various 
proposals have been made on the reasons why some individuals are prone to 
cooperate and others not. The first section presents the foundations and analysis 
tools of the propensity to cooperate. 
 
2.1. Individuals propensity to cooperate 
One of the conclusion of the game theory is that sometimes organization 
members have an interest in cooperation to enable them to lead to a situation that is 
far preferable to that in which the decisions based on a selfish individual reasoning 
would have led the organization. Considering individual’s propensity to cooperate 
is then decisive in individual and collective decisions making because it is likely to 
govern the evolution of the organization. 
In addition, it is interesting to look for a suitable means that could be mobilized 
to achieve a greater cooperation between a given organization’s members. It can 
be, among other things, by the introduction of reputation (Andreoni & Miller, 
1993), the use of communication between participants or the introduction of 
punishment of the stowaway by other participants (Gachter et al., 2010). 
Experimental economics used, among others, public good game (Andreoni, 
1988; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) with different variants to respond to the question of 
the identification of social stimuli or economic challenges that can be used to 
obtain a greater cooperation from organization’s members. Fischbacher & Gaechter 
(2008) propose a classification of individuals in four categories: 
1. free riders (FR): Those who don’t cooperate within organizations and look for 
their selfish interest regardless of the contributions of other members;  
2. conditional contributors (CC): Those whose contribution depend on that of 
others; they increase their contribution when the other members increase theirs; 
3. triangular contributors (CT): Those whose contribution increases with that of 
the other participants when the latter is low and reduce their contribution when 
those of the other exceeds a certain threshold; 
4. unclassifiables (I): those whose contributions doesn’t obey to a given rules. 
Parallel to this categorization, social preference theories have been proposed to 
identify the motivations that govern individual’s decision and the motivation to 
behave as a free rider, a conditional contributor, a triangular contributor, etc. 
Neoclassical theory that postulates that individual decision making is solely based 
on their selfish monetary gain justify only free riding behavior. Social preference 
theory intends to propose a framework that justify the other observed behaviors. 
 
2.2. Social preference theories, proposals and interpretations 
In neoclassical theory, social preferences’ analysis is articulated around game 
theory which helped to structure the knowledge on the possible strategies and the 
determinants of the preferred options in social interactions. It led some 
recommendations about the strategies that each participant can implement in such 
interactions to pull the best situation for them and for the group. As well, the 
equilibrium that can emerge from individual decision can be a Nash, perfect Nash 
in sub-game, perfect Bayesian Nash depending on the conditions of interactions; 
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specially in relation to the information available for the actors and the structure of 
decisions they can make (Giraud, 2000; Miller, 2003; Gibbons, 1992). 
The recommendations of this paradigm are normative insofar that they are 
dictated as the strategy that a rational selfish individual who interact with other 
participants who act in the same way can implement. It was necessary to confront 
these prescriptions with individual’s behaviors in real situations. 
Experimental Economics served as a privileged framework for the validation of 
assumptions and conclusions of the game theory. It is based on a wide variety of 
experimental studies that simulate various possible environment and help to depict 
the motivation of individual’s decision made in social interactions. 
As well, ultimatum game (Greenberg, 1978; Slonim & Roth, 1998; Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999; Chang & Maheswaran, 2011), dictator game (Kahneman et al., 
1986; Engel, 2010) and investment or trust game (Berg et al., 1995; Meidinger et 
al., 2001) have been used to study altruism, reciprocity and trust. Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (Giraud, 2000; Dreber et al., 2014) and public good game (Marwell & 
Ames, 1981; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Gachter et al., 2010) were used to study an 
individual’s propensity to cooperate. In a complementary way, the battle of sexes 
(Osborne, 2000) and deer hunt allowed to study the propensity to coordinate. The 
negotiation ability is studied through a beauty game. 
In addition, the relationships between these behaviors have been subject to 
recent researches. For example, Dreber et al. (2014) have studied the link between 
the propensity to give in the dictator game and cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma game. They show that people who cooperate more in the prisoner 
dilemma game are not necessarily those who give the most in the dictator game. 
This result shows that individual’s social preferences have some specificities that 
should be understood; more specifically in the African context. 
The authors conclude that some individuals are not only interested in their 
monetary gain. They discover that altruism can be one of the motivation underlying 
these observed behaviors. The lack of convergence of self-declared sharing in the 
dictator game and cooperation in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game informs 
on the specificities of individual behavior as a function of the decision framework. 
The empirical studies based on these different games conclude that it is necessary 
to broaden the framework to understand individual’s strategies in social 
interactions. They allowed, among other things, to realize that participants in these 
games do not always make their decision on the basis of their selfish well-being 
and don’t think only of their monetary gain. They look at other considerations such 
as altruism, desire of reciprocity, inequity aversion, look for equity, reciprocity, … 
These proposals represent the social preference theory built on the contributions of 
Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Fehr & Schmidt (1999), Bolton & Ockenfels (2000) 
and Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2004). 
2.2.1. Rabin’s intentional fairness model (1993) 
Rabin (1993) postulates that an individual adopts an equity behavior which 
stimulate him to be benevolent toward people who are kind with him and make its 
blow to those who are malicious even if with the price of renouncing to his own 
monetary gain or saving. 
This framework is applied to propose some explanation of the difference in 
individual propensity to cooperate in the prisoner dilemma or to coordinate in the 
battle of sexes. It concludes that the prevalence of cooperation in these games is the 
result of the anticipation of other members’ cooperation and his intention to be fair 
with them. 
Note that the framework is hardly generalizable to game with several players. 
Indeed, author discuss the decision of an individual who is member of an 
organization within which some members have been malware with him and other 
benevolent. The optimal decision did not seem obvious to derive in these 
conditions. These limits have stimulated the proposal of sequentially reciprocity 
theory by Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2004) which generalizes Rabin’s 
framework including several participants and a dynamic cases. But the 
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implementation of the conclusion in empirical studies is not straightforward. 
Levine (1998) proposes another explanation to individual social interactions’ 
behavior. 
2.2.2.  Levine’s altruism and spitefulness model 
Levine (1998) proposed a model in which everyone involved in a social 
interaction makes his decision by optimizing a psychological utility function. This 
function is a combination of the wellbeing associated to his own monetary gain and 
those of the other participants associated with their earnings. It assigns a weight to 
his monetary gain and a weight to those of the others. 
The author relies on this framework to elucidate the results obtained in the 
public good game. He predicts two situations. The individuals who cooperate 
because they have a high altruism’s coefficient and people who do not cooperate 
because their coefficient of altruism is low. As well, an individual’s propensity to 
cooperate is determined by his altruism’s level. It should, however, be pointed out 
that Levine (1998)’s altruism and spitefulness’ model predicted two extreme cases: 
individuals who contribute with their entire Token and those who do not contribute 
in the public good game. However, experimental studies’ results don’t exhibit this 
bimodal situation. 
2.2.3. Inequity aversion theory 
Fehr & Schmidt (1999) developed a model of inequity aversion to explain the 
stylized facts observed in cooperation or competition’s game. The model retains 
the assumption that individuals are rational. But they add that participant are driven 
by a self-center’s aversion to inequity. In other words, they consider that everyone 
is disposed to sacrifice a part of his individual wellbeing (associated to his 
monetary gain) to get closer to the most equitable situation. Individuals according 
to their behavior can be stored in two major categories: pure selfish (only 
motivated by his monetary gain) and inequity averse (who is interested in the 
reward or punishment of its counterparts on the basis of their strategies). Based on 
this model, the authors propose a reading of the stylized facts of public good game. 
They establish that inequity averse individual are likely to have a higher propensity 
to cooperate than that of rational selfish individuals. However, in a group, the 
presence of rational selfish individuals can induce a non-cooperative behavior 
among individuals highly inequity averse. However, as the authors point out, the 
application of the inequity aversion theory face some difficulties to explain the 
stylized facts relating to altruism’s propensity. 
2.2.4. Equity, reciprocity and competition theory (ERC) 
In the same sense like Fehr & Schmidt (1999), Bolton & Ockenfels (2000) 
proposed a theory that also aims at explaining the stylized facts of games in which 
the Equity, Reciprocity and Cooperation are the main participants decisions’ 
motivations. The difference with Fehr & Schmidt (1999)’s model is that it is a 
model that can be applied to incomplete information games. 
The model is based on the postulate that individual decisions in a social 
interaction are motivated by self-monetary gain’s and the relative gain’s level 
compared to those of other participants. Thus, the conclusion is that the stylized 
facts observed in games are the result of the interaction between self-interest and 
equity looking.  
Authors apply this framework to explain the behavior observed in various social 
interactions. They provide some explanations to some facts that appear has a 
puzzle by another author. Overall, these four proposals related to individual 
preferences supplement the neoclassical theory to provide a better understanding of 
individual decision making. Despite their significant contributions to the 
understanding of individual propensity to cooperate within organizations, there are 
little researches that mobilizes the overall frameworks to explain behaviors 
observed in experiments. Indeed, each author limits his analysis to a given 
framework in providing an explanation to the stylized facts. Fischbacher & 
Gaechter (2008) proposed an explanation of the difference of propensity to 
cooperate observed in experimental studies. They established, among others, that 
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contribution’s decline in public good game is not due to behavior’s changes. It is 
due to the conditional nature of people contributions and the beliefs’ changing 
during the session. 
It seems interesting to study the influence of possible motivation of individual’s 
behaviors in social interactions on cooperation. In that perspective, it is useful to 
study the heterogeneity of these individual motivations in a given population. 
Indeed, as established in the literature review each proposed model seems 
insufficient to explain the observed behavior in reality and in the experiments 
conducted by the authors cited. That is the goal of this research which mobilized 
data on experiments to study the influence of social preferences on the propensity 
to cooperate. 
 
3. Research methodology 
The study of the influence of the social preference on an individual’s propensity 
to cooperate faced a triple challenge. Firstly, it raises the problem of tools that can 
be used to measure efficiently the two key concepts : social preference and an 
individual’s propensity to cooperate. Thereafter, it is imperative to establish a 
formal link between the measures and decision making’s parameters. The last point 
focus on the analytical tools suitable to study the influence of the social preference 
on the propensity to cooperate. 
This section presents the approach used. It covers the strategy used to collect the 
data, to identify individual social preferences and to estimate decision’s 
parameters. 
 
3.1. Social preference identification and propensity to cooperate’s 
measure, an experimental study 
The data used in this research are from Ouattara (2015). They are part of data 
collected from an experimental study. It covers a sample of 130 students from 
CESAG Business School based in Dakar (Senegal). We used data related to four 
(4) treatments: dictators game, ultimatum game, Trust game and public good game. 
The analysis establishes that the sample is composed of 81 men and 49 women; 
they are between the ages of 21 and 41 years and they come from eleven african 
countries. 
The choice of the studied population has been dictated by the desire to test the 
validity of the conclusions established in other economic spaces in an African 
context and by the accessibility of students for experimental studies 
implementation. They constitute a working group from which we can obtain results 
that are generalizable to the whole population where they have been drawn. 
3.1.1. Measurement of the propensity to cooperate: a public good game 
Individual propensity to cooperate is studied through a public good game 
(Marwell & Ames, 1981; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Gachter et al., 2010). Each 
participant is informed that he is part of a team composed of four other anonymous 
participants and that he is endowed with ten tokens. It must make the decision of 
the number of tokens that he would like to put in the common pool. The remaining 
is kept for him. Each token retained earns 0.15 €. While each token placed in the 
kitty provide an amount of 0.075 € to each member of its group (including 
himself). Thus, if for a given group, all members put their entire token 
(cooperation), each one will win 3.00 €. Has the opposite, if no one put any token 
in the common pot (absence of cooperation), each person receives the amount of 
1.5 €. In addition, if all participants except one (alone) decide to put their entire 
token in the common pool then those who put their tokens will receive 2.25 € and 
the one who didn’t put anything will get 3.75 €. In this situation, the participant 
who didn’t cooperate is a free rider and he receive an higher amount than the 
others. Between these two extreme cases, there is a range of situations from full 
cooperation to free riding. 
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Each participant’s decision depends both on its anticipation of what other group 
members will do and his propensity to cooperate. A participant with a strong 
propensity to cooperate will be inclined to put his entire tokens in the common 
pool, hoping that the other will do the same. A non-cooperative participant will 
retain all his tokens for himself and will expect that his teammate will put at least a 
part of their token in the common pool. As well, an individual’s propensity to 
cooperate is measured by the quantity of token that he puts in the common pool. 
The experiment is repeated ten times to study the evolution of the propensity to 
cooperate. The repetition allows the study of the influence of the lack of 
cooperation of his teammate in a given period on his contribution in the following 
periods. Each participant is informed of his total gain once all participants have 
made their decision. 
This treatment is part of a global experiment whose description is available in 
Ouattara (2015). At the end of the study, each participant receives in cash the 
cumulative gain. This strategy is used to ensure that each participant make its 
decisions in a real situation and not in a hypothetical way. 
3.1.2. Identification of social preferences: a combination of dictator, ultimatum 
and trust games 
To identify the motivations that govern an individual’s decisions in social 
interactions, a combination of three experiments is used: dictator, ultimatum and 
trust games. 
3.1.2.1. Treatment 02: dictator game 
Experiment 02 is consisted in submitting each participant at a dictator game 
(Kahneman et al., 1986; Engel, 2010). Each participant is informed that at the end 
of experiment, he gains 15.27 € and that another anonym participant receives 
nothing. It is then proposed to share his gain with this participant. The amount that 
he wishes to transfer to this participant is left to its discretion and will be withdraw 
on his gain. If he doesn’t share is amount there would not have any punishment or 
additional compensation. He is free to decide the amount he will like to send to his 
binomial.  
The interviewee is not forced to share. He doesn't obtain any remuneration or 
sanction if he shares or refuses to share. As well his decision is essentially dictated 
by its degree of altruism. As well, if he pays a non-null amount to his pair, he will 
not get a zero gain. In so doing he shares its monetary gain with his pair. He will 
not be encouraged to act in this way if he doesn’t attach any well-being to his pairs 
well-being. 
The part of his gain that he shares with his binomial measure his social 
preference. A selfish rational person will not be motivated to transfer an amount to 
his binomial. At the opposite, an individual sensitized to the well-being of others 
will tend to share a substantial part of his gain with his binomial. A formal 
relationship between the level of sharing and an individual social preferences level 
will be established in the following. 
3.1.2.2. Treatment 03: identification of acceptance’s thresholds in ultimatum 
game 
Treatment 03 is designed to identify a participant acceptance’s thresholds in an 
ultimatum game (Greenberg, 1978; Slonim & Roth, 1998; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; 
Chang & Maheswaran, 2011). The scenario of the experiment is worded as 
following. 
You are matched with another participant with whom you will interact 
anonymously to share a given amount. You will interact sequentially. 
Participant 01 is informed that he is the first decision maker. A given amount M is 
offered to them. He is asked to make a proposal of the sharing that he would like to 
make between him and his binomial. The proposal will be sent to his binomial who 
has the last decision: refuse or accept. If he is agreed with the sharing made, each 
person receives the amount as proposed by the first participant. If he disagrees, 
each participant receives nothing: 0 €. Before proceeding the game, data on the 
intentional acceptance’s threshold have been collected. Each participant has been 
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invited to put themselves in the second player’s position. He is asked to provide 
information on his decision to accept or refuse his pairs’ proposal for different 
levels of the participant 01’s sharing proposal. 
This step allows to estimate each participant’s acceptance’s threshold in 
ultimatum game. This threshold is used to identify the motivation that governs an 
individual decision making in social interactions. 
3.1.2.3. Treatment 04: intentional reciprocal gifts in trust game 
In Treatment 04, it is proposed to participants a trust game designed by Berg et 
al. (1995) (Meidinger et al., 2001). This game consists in matching anonymously 
each participant who receives an initial endowment of 1.52 € at the beginning of 
the experiment. Participant 01 is informed that he is paired anonymously with 
another participant and is invited to choose the amount (on his 1.52 €) that he 
would like to transfer to the Participant 02. He is informed that the amount send is 
multiplied by three and transfert to the recipient. Once informed of the total amount 
he received, participant 02 must decide the part of the amount received that he 
would like to give back to participant 01. Participant 02 is not obliged to make a 
reciprocal gift. Nothing will arrive if he decides to send nothing to participant 01. 
Before proceeding the game, information on participant 02’s intentional 
reciprocal gift are collected. Doing this, each participant is asked to put himself in 
the position of participant 02. For different amount received, he is asked to declare 
the amount that he would give back as reciprocal gift. Ten different amount as gift 
are proposed. 
The amount of the reciprocal gift is used to identify the motivations that 
underlie participant’s decision making process in social interactions. 
The whole experiments have been implemented under the platform Z-tree 
(Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments) developed by Urs 
Fischbacher (2007). The use of these experiments allows us to have information on 
sharing level in dictator game, acceptance’s threshold in ultimatum game, 
intentional reciprocal gifts in the trust game for ten amount received and the 
contribution in the public good game. 
Sum up, the combination of the four treatments allows to characterize 
individuals according to their social preferences (altruism, the desire of reciprocity, 
the inequity aversion, reciprocity, …) and their propensity to cooperate. To achieve 
this, it is necessary to determine an analytical function that links participant’s 
decision to their motivations and decision making parameters in social interaction. 
 
3.2. Identification of social preferences and estimation of individual 
parameters 
Based on this dataset, we proposed a process to identify of social preferences 
that govern the decisions made by each participant in the experiments. To achieve 
this, it is essential to establish formal relations between indicators and the key 
variables of the theoretical models. The resolution of the program of each decision 
maker establishes that indicators are related to the characteristics of individual 
social preferences according to table 01 below. 
Recall that the relations have been established by maximizing the utility 
function associated to each motivation. The proofs can be found in Ouattara 
(2015). 
These relations allow to build an identification strategy for the characteristics of 
social preferences. 
Social preferences’ identification and parameters estimation are made by step. 
Firstly, we defined social preference’s classes: Rational egoist (class 01), altruist 
and spiteful (class 02), inequity averse (class 03) and look for Equity, Reciprocity 
and Cooperation (class 04).  
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Table 1. Summary of attended decision in experiments depending on social preferences 
Theoretical 
Framework 
Individual utility 
function 
Sharing 
(dictator game) 
Threshold of 
acceptance 
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Notes: Yi: individual i’s gain, Yj: individual j’s gain, Pdi: Sharing in the dictator game, Sui: 
acceptance’s threshold in ultimatum game; Rcoi (x): intentional reciprocal gift of individual i in case 
of the gift of an amount x; ai: altruism coefficient; αi: negative inequity aversion coefficient; mi: 
monetary preference coefficient; bi: inequity aversion coefficient 
 
For each class, the link between the indicators and the parameters is based on 
Table 01. On this basis, we build a score of belonging to a given class; computed as 
following: 
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In this expression, the highlighted iterms designate the values that a person 
should provide if his preferences are consistent with the predictions of the model 
defining the class k. For a given class, a person whose score is equal to 0 has his 
answers that lies within the expected values for the class. The score is higher than 0 
if the value provided by the participant is away from those expected. Thus, for each 
participant, four scores associated to each class are computed. Based on these 
scores, an individual is assigned to the class k for which it has the lowest value. 
Sum up, this approach provides an assignment of each participant to one social 
preference class. 
 
3.3. Methodology of the study of the influence of social preferences on 
the propensity to cooperate 
An econometric modeling is used to study the influence of social preferences on 
the propensity to cooperate. The latter is measured by the number of tokens puts in 
the common pool by the participant. We estimated a count model linking the 
number of tokens deposited in the common pool to the class of social preference. 
Individual variables such as the contribution to the previous period are considered 
as explanatory variable to control their effects on the propensity to cooperate. 
Formally, the analysis is based on the estimation of the following relationship: 
 
 jXefSocfContr iiji ,,Pr,   
 
The functional form is chosen among the possible count models that are poison 
models, negative binomial, zero-inflated poison and zero-inflated negative 
binomial. The estimation and validation of the model are implemented in 
accordance with the approach provided by Miller (2007). The modules developed 
under Stata by Long & Freese (2014) are used as tools.  
Sum up, this section presents the methodology. It presents the data collection 
tools and social preference and the propensity to cooperate measurement. It ended 
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by the description of the approach used to estimate the relationship between the 
two key concepts. After these presentation, the results drawn can be discussed. 
 
4. Research results 
The objective of this section is to present the results of the research. It begins by 
the presentation of the characteristics of the participants’ propensity to cooperate. 
The characteristics of social preferences are discussed thereafter. It ends by the 
analysis of the influence of individual social’s preferences on the propensity to 
cooperate. 
 
4.1. Participants’ propensity to cooperate 
Let’s recall that an individual’s propensity to cooperate is measured by the 
number of tokens on its endowment of ten tokens that he decides to put in the 
common pool at each step of the public good game. 
Table 2 below presents descriptive statistics of contributions in the public good 
game. It is arisen from these results that in average participants contributed with 
around three token (mean = 3.40) at the first period of the game. Thus, on average, 
each participant contributes in the common pool with the third of his endowment. 
This contribution decreases drastically at the second period by one third (mean = 
2.35) in average and remains approximately stable for the following step of the 
game. A mean comparison test shows that the contribution’s decreasing is 
statistically significant (Pvalue= 0.006). 
 
Table 2. Evolution of the contribution in the public good game 
Period N * Median Average Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
1 130 2.00 3.40 3.31 0 10 
2 130 1.00 2.35 2.82 0 10 
3 130 1.00 2.26 2.97 0 10 
4 129 1.00 2.13 2.86 0 10 
5 121 1.00 2.50 3.38 0 10 
6 116 0.50 2.16 3.08 0 10 
7 111 1.00 1.63 2.48 0 10 
8 100 1.00 2.17 3.07 0 10 
9 79 1.00 2.09 3.01 0 10 
10 45 1.00 2.53 3.61 0 10 
Total 1091 1.00 2.33 3.06 0 10 
Notes: We present in this table the characteristics of the distribution of contributions in public good 
games. * Note that the differences in sample size comes from the fact that the size of some cohorts of 
participants is not a multiple of 4. In these cohorts, some individuals have not been assigned to groups 
for some periods. In addition, participants of the latest cohort participate only in five periods game 
instead of the ten described in the methodology. 
  
The cooperation level observed is higher than the results found in the literature 
which records a contribution of the quarter of the endowment (Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999). The contribution’s reduction over the periods has been widely documented 
in the literature, and the issue of some researches is to provide an explanation of 
the causes of this decline. 
The literature harbors a controversy. Indeed, some assigns this decreasing to a 
modification of participants’ propensity to cooperate during the experiment. 
Fischbacher & Gaechter (2008) showed that this decline is not necessarily due to a 
change in the propensity to cooperate but is due to the existence of free rider 
among participants. When a participant with high propensity to cooperate meet a 
free rider at a given period of the game, he modifies his behavior by reducing his 
contribution in the common pool. They conclude that the existence of free rider in 
real live is not necessarily attributable to the human nature but to the modification 
of cooperation based on the experience of no-collaboration with free riders in the 
past. The existence of one free rider in a group can reduce the cooperation of the 
whole group. Thus, the contribution’s decline can be associated with participant’s 
disappointment at an early stage of the game. It can also be associated to the desire 
of betraying other participants by showing a high propensity to cooperation in the 
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first stage of the game and free ride at the subsequent stages when the others are 
confident in the group’s cooperation. 
An analysis of the relationship between the contributions’ level at a given 
period and that of their group members in the previous period allow to discriminate 
between these two explanations found in the literature. The result of the analysis is 
shown by the scatter plot in Figure 1. 
 
 
VarConrii,t =  0.3294   -    1.037*** Ecart_01i,t +εi,t  R² = 0.341 
(0.031)       (0.0778) 
Figure 1. Scatter plot of contributions changes vs. previous period’s differential 
contributions 
 
The scatter plot highlights a decreasing relationship between participants’ 
contribution variation at each period and the gap between his contributions’ level 
and his group members’ average contribution at the previous period. The linear 
regression between the two variables shows that the influence is statistically 
significant at Pvalue of 5% and that 104% of the gap of contributions is reflected 
by the participant in his contribution at the next period.  
We can conclude that the declining in contributions is, for a large part, due to 
participants’ disappointment when he encounters at a given period people who 
contribute less. This relation explains one third of the contribution’s heterogeneity 
between individual and game’s period. 
We can also observe that the contribution’s distribution is very heterogeneous 
as we can observe in the distribution’s standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum’s values. Indeed, table 2 show that there is some participant who 
contributes by zero at each period of the game (minimum = 0) and others who 
continue to contribute with their entire endowment at the last period of the game 
(maximum = 10). This heterogeneity is translated by a coefficient of variation 
which is greater than 1. The contribution’s heterogeneity between participant 
translate that of the propensity to cooperate’ characteristics between them. 
But before going there, it seems interesting to study the distribution of the 
population according to their social preferences. 
 
4.2. Social preferences’ characteristics 
In this section, we present the distribution of sharing in dictator game, 
acceptance’s threshold in ultimatum game and intentional reciprocal gifts in trust 
game. The results are recorded in table 3 below. 
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4.2.1. Sharing in dictator game 
In dictator game, approximately 12% of population doesn’t intend to offer any 
part of their endowment. Persons who declare their intention to transfer an amount 
to their binomial send, on average, 25 per cent of their endowment (Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Characteristics of sharing in dictator game, acceptance’s threshold and intentional 
reciprocal gift 
  Obs. Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
share levels in the dictator game 
With null sharing  130 22.1 19 0 100 
With sharing 114 25.2 18.3 0.01 100 
Acceptance’s threshold in ultimatum game 
Threshold 130 35.8 17.4 0 70 
Intentional reciprocal gift in trust game 
Fraction of 
endowment 
given by the 
binomial (%) 
10 130 52.7 26.7 0 100 
20 130 46.9 21.8 0 100 
30 130 45.3 20.3 0 100 
40 130 44.8 19.5 0 100 
50 130 44.7 19 0 100 
60 130 43.5 18.2 0 100 
70 130 41.7 18.3 0 100 
80 130 40.5 17 0 100 
90 130 40.1 16.7 0 100 
100 130 40.9 18.1 0 100 
 
By comparing the average sharing with the value expected for each social 
preference classes, we can derive that there is more participant whose decision in 
the dictator game is guided by the look of Equity, Reciprocity and Cooperation 
(ERC). In addition, the analysis of the histogram of sharing in Figure 2 highlights a 
bimodal distribution in the population. We can conclude that the population is 
composed of two sub-populations. One composed of people who envision to pay 
the entire amount of their endowment to their binomial. Another for those who pay 
less than half of their endowment.  
We can realize that the population is relatively heterogeneous according to the 
sharing in the dictator game. Indeed, the observed sharing level cover the entire 
support of the distribution. Values lies between 0 and 100%. 
4.2.2. Acceptance’s threshold in ultimatum game 
The results indicate that the acceptance’s threshold is on average 36%. This 
value is out of the inequity aversion theory’s prediction zone but lies on forecasting 
zone of two other theories. The histogram of the acceptance’s thresholds shows a 
bimodal distribution concentrated around 10% and 50% (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Distribution of sharing, acceptance’s threshold  
and intentional reciprocal gifts 
 
Thus, the distribution of acceptance’s threshold highlights a heterogeneity. One 
important observation is that the average acceptance’s threshold doesn’t reveal a 
clear predominance of altruism and spitefulness theory and the Equity, Reciprocity 
and Cooperation theory. Indeed, these two theories provide a similar forecast about 
the acceptance’s threshold’s range. 
4.2.3. Intentional reciprocal gift in trust game 
The last component of the analysis of social preferences’ indicators is about the 
intentional reciprocal gift in the trust game. 
As we can observe in figure 2, the intentional reciprocal gift’s coefficient is 
linked to the hypothetical gift by a hyperbolic curve. A log-log adjustment on data 
provide an empirical relation Y = 66.95exp(-0.11*X). This equation means that 
each supplement percent of endowment offers leads a decreased of 11% of the 
intentional reciprocal gift’s coefficient. For a gift of 10% of his binomial’s 
endowment, participant promised in average a reciprocal gift of 52% of the amount 
get from this transfer. The intentional reciprocal gift’s coefficient decreased with 
the part of his binomial’s endowment that he offers. The reciprocal gift represents 
40% of the amount received when his binomial transfers all his endowment. As 
shown in table 01, this hyperbolic configuration is consistent with the prediction of 
altruism and spitefulness theory and the Equity, Reciprocity and Cooperation 
theory (ERC). 
As for the other indicator, the population is characterized by heterogeneity in 
relation to the intentional reciprocal gifts since the observed values cover all the 
support of the indicator’s distribution. The population could be divided into sub-
categories as suggested in the form of the histogram. 
4.2.4. Distribution of individuals based on their decision schema 
The social preferences identification’s process provides two classes 
characterized respectively by the selfish rationality and the inequity averse. 
participants are unevenly distributed between the two categories. The first 
comprises 19% of the sample with 25 individuals against 104 in the second class. 
Individuals classified in the category of selfish rational promised to donate less 
in the dictator game, have a relatively low acceptance’s threshold and have an 
intentional reciprocal gift on average lower than those of the second class. The 
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multivariate comparison tests confirm the significance of the observed differences 
(P-value=0.000). 
These classes are used to study the influence of social preferences on the 
propensity to cooperate. 
 
4.3. Influence of social preferences on the contribution in the public good 
game 
According to the methodology for the estimation of this type of model, we 
estimated four models: poison model, zero inflated poison model (ZIP), negative 
binomial model and zero inflated negative binomial model (ZINB) (Long & 
Freese, 2014). The comparison of the explanatory powers of these models allows to 
identify the more suitable to the dataset. 
The variable of interest is divided into four components. Indeed, we considered 
the contribution at the first period (contribution 01), the contribution’s increase 
from one period to another (VariContriplus), a contribution’s decrease from one 
period to another (VariContriplus) and the variable that provides information on 
the constant of the contribution in reference to previous period contribution 
(VariContrizero). The consideration of these variables is motivated by a desire to 
have a deepest knowledge on the influence of social preference on the propensity 
to cooperate. Indeed, the first period contribution’s level reflects the individual 
preferences while individual contribution at the other periods can be influenced by 
his history, the experience. For the other periods, the influence of the social 
preference on the contribution’s modification inform on its influence on the 
propensity to keep cooperation behaviors. It is this logic that governed the building 
of the variables of interest.  
The results of the estimation of the poison model are recorded in the Table 4. 
It comes from this table that inequity averse individuals contribute on average 
approximately 25% more than those driven by selfishness at the first period of the 
public good game. Note that the difference is not statistically significant. The 
influence which is statistically significant is the influence of social preference on 
the contribution’s reduction because of a disappointment in the previous period. In 
model 03, the social preference’s measure has a negative sign which is statistically 
significant at the threshold of 1%. We can conclude that the social preference 
reduces the individual’s propensity to reduce their contribution. 
Model 04 establishes that social preference positively influences the probability 
of maintaining the same contribution’s level from one period to another. This 
influence is statistically significant. In addition, this model provides some 
information on the influence of social preference on contribution’s adjustment due 
to contributions’ gap at the previous period. The positive sign of the coefficient 
tells us that inequity averse individuals are prone to keep the same contribution’s 
level at the next period when they find a difference between their contributions and 
the average contributions of their group members. That is, when they realized that 
at a given period, their contribution is higher than the average contribution of their 
group members, they are prone to keep the same contribution’s level at the next 
period. 
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Table 4. Results of the estimation of the influence of social preference on the propensity to 
cooperate 
VARIABLE Contribution 01 VariContriplus VariContrimoins VariContrizero 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Averse to inequity 0.254 -0.293 0.114 
   (-0.193) (-0.205) (-0.147) 
 gap_01 
 
-0.118 *** 0.254 *** 
   
 
(-0.0389) (-0.0186) 
 Constant 1,314 *** 0.908 *** -0.393 *** 
   (-0.177) (-0.22) (-0.149) 
 Inflate 
    Averse to inequity 0.175 -0.357 -4,376 ** -0.296 * 
  (-0.614) (-0.26) (-2,108) (-0.178) 
gap_01 
 
0.160 *** -16.50 *** -0.389 *** 
  
 
(-0.045) (-5,747) (-0.0751) 
Averse to inequity: gap_01 
   
0.209 *** 
  
   
-0.0799 
Constant -1,229 ** 0.520 * -19.81 *** 0.0234 
  (-0.571) (-0.295) (-7,443) (-0.161) 
lnalpha -1,438 *** 0.285 0.0197 
   (-0.363) (-0.318) (-0.129) 
 observations 129 952 952 952 
p 
 
0.116 0 
 N_zero 
 
696 672 
 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** P <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. In this table, we present the result of the 
estimation of the count model between the contribution in public good game and the social preferences classes, 
contribution levels at the previous steps (gap_01: the difference between the participant's contribution and that of 
the mean contribution of his group members at the previous period). The depend variables are contribution at the 
first period (Contribution 01), the increase of contribution (varicontriplus), the decrease of contribution 
(varicontrimoins), the constante of contribution (varicontrizero) comparing to his contribution at the last period. 
Variable “gap _01 ’represents the difference between the participant’s contribution and the average contribution of 
his group members the previous period. 
 
Thus, we can conclude that the social preference, including the inequity 
aversion, tends to protect individuals from the temptation to reduce their degree of 
cooperation when they meet free riders. Their cooperation’s behavior is more 
resilient than selfish individuals. This last result has not been documented in 
previous research. Thus, we can conclude that the social preference does not have a 
significant impact on the propensity to cooperate but rather confers a greater 
resilience in front of cooperation’s failure within an organization. This last result 
close the presentation of the results. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper aims at contributing on the identification of factors that influence the 
propensity to cooperate within organizations with an application in the African 
context. We emphasis the influence of social preferences on the propensity to 
cooperate. It emerged from the literature review that individual social preferences 
can be characterized by selfish rational, altruism and spitefulness, an inequity 
aversion, look for Equity, Reciprocity and Cooperation which are the theoretical 
frameworks developed to explain individual decisions made in social interactions. 
The identification of individual social preference is based on their intentional 
sharing in dictator game, their acceptance’s threshold in the trust game and their 
intentional reciprocal gift in trust game. We classify participants in two categories. 
Rational selfish individuals represent around 20% of the studied population. The 
other individuals are characterized by an inequity aversion. 
These classes are used to explain the differences in contributions in public good 
game, a measure of the propensity to cooperate. We establish that social 
preferences affect the propensity to cooperate even when we control the 
contributions’ adjustments in relation with experience in the game. The influence 
of inequity aversion lies in the resilience toward greater cooperation that it confers. 
Individuals characterized by this preference are less inclined to reduce their 
contribution when they meet free riders, individuals who think only of their 
monetary gain. The results obtained are close to those of Fehr & Schmidt (1999) 
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and Fischbacher & Gaechter (2008). We established, as these authors, participants’ 
contribution’s declining during the sequence of the game. This declination is 
attributable to the presence of free riders whose low contributions induce a decline 
in individuals’ contributions. We thus confirm the results of Fischbacher & 
Gaechter (2008) who show that the decline in contributions in social interactions is 
not the fact of cooperation behavior’s change but the influence of individual stories 
on their behavior. This result based on data collected in African context aims at 
confirming that African people react as other homo-economicus in other economic 
area. Its implication is that the causes of the social and economic inefficiencies are 
not necessary the consequences of a typical way of thinking. Additionally, we 
highlight the place of the inequity aversion in the resilience of the equilibrium 
favoring cooperation in organization. 
The conclusion of this research open a discussion on its managerial 
implications. The research has been implemented in WAEMU’s context 
preoccupied by the identification of the suitable means to push their socio-
economic development. The understanding of cooperation is a prerequisite to shed 
a light on the consequences of the low development of regional financial market. 
Indeed, despite an enormous development potential and the prediction of 
endogenous growth models, we observe that the WAEMU’s regional financial 
market remain entangled in inefficiencies. The most important is the low depth and 
liquidity of the stock exchange, bonds and interbank markets. These compartments 
record little transaction and an insufficient involvement of companies which can 
realize an IPO. A priori, their low participation could be interpreted as the result of 
a cost advantage’s trade-of.  
The results of the analysis of the influence of social preferences on the 
propensity to cooperate can be mobilized in the study of the decision to proceed an 
IPO at WAEMU’s regional stock exchange. It can help to understanding the 
development of the interbank market. Its application highlights the fact that the 
equilibrium that prevails in the WAEMU’s regional market is aroused, at least 
partially, from actors’ propensity to cooperate. 
Indeed, in deciding to proceed their IPO, company’s shareholders can contribute 
to the deepening of the market. This improvement would contribute to the creation 
of a better financial market, lead diversification and better risk sharing in the 
business environment and its improvement, provide additional information to 
investors and attract others international fund managers, …The consequences for 
the entire economic zone would be the improvement of wealth creations financing 
and thus an increase in socio-economic development. The decision to avoid their 
company’s listing by the grand majority of company’s shareholders as we observed 
in the market at this moment, leads to the market’s lethargy, establishes a climate 
of mistrust and legitimate suspicion, …Situation that inhibits activities’ funding 
and limit WAEMU’s socio-economic development. 
The research of means to break this equilibrium and initiate a new dynamic 
require the understanding of the place of actors’ social preferences. Indeed, the 
research results show that if participants are motivated by the search of their 
individual interests, the equilibrium that currently prevails would persist. Has the 
opposite, if they are driven by an inequity aversion, the pulses in terms of 
regulation or companies’ IPO would contribute to reverse the trend. The results of 
this research make some clarification in this direction but requires an enrichment 
by mopping up certain methodological and external validity limits. Indeed, the 
results deserve to be extended in real organizations. In this study, we considered 
the situation of individuals who do not know each other. It would be interesting to 
study the influence of lifting of this anonymity hypothesis on the conclusions. In 
addition, the identification of social preferences is based on declaration: intentional 
sharing, acceptance’s threshold and reciprocal gift. An analysis of the consistency 
between intention and practice should allow us to refine our knowledge of social 
preferences’ characteristics. The lifting of these limits can be done in future 
researches. 
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